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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 19-2137 
___________ 
 
B. JANET PETTI, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
OCEAN COUNTY BOARD OF HEALTH; 
OCEAN COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENT 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.N.J. Civil Action No. 3:15-cv-07305) 
District Judge: Honorable Brian R. Martinotti 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 21, 2020 
Before:  AMBRO, GREENAWAY, Jr., and PORTER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed March 31, 2020) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Pro se appellant B. Janet Petti appeals the District Court’s grant of summary 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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judgment in favor of defendants Ocean County Board of Health and Ocean County 
Health Department (“OCHD”).  Petti brought claims of discrimination in violation of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., retaliation in 
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and wrongful 
termination.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
I. 
 Petti began working as an accountant for OCHD in 2004.1  She worked in one of 
the two buildings at OCHD’s office campus.  In November 2012, construction began at 
the building next to Petti’s; the windows in her building were taped in preparation.  Later 
that month, she emailed Ocean County’s Director of Administration and Program 
Development, Victoria Miragliotta, to ask whether construction debris containing 
asbestos was getting into her building, out of concern that it could aggravate an 
unspecified medical condition.  Several days later, Petti emailed Miragliotta and Ocean 
County’s Public Health Coordinator to inform them that she had observed construction 
debris on her windowsill and her notebooks.  Petti also asked whether the construction 
work outside was being safely performed.  Miragliotta responded that an asbestos 
sampling survey had been conducted on the construction site in March 2012 which 
concluded that there was no asbestos-containing material at the site per Environmental 
Protection Agency guidelines.  Miragliotta also informed Petti that her building’s 
 
1  The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. 
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ventilation system was not connected to any demolition that was occurring involving the 
other building.  Petti restated her concerns about construction debris getting into her work 
area to her direct supervisor. 
 In early December, Petti’s work location was temporarily transferred to a different 
building away from OCHD’s office campus.  Toward the end of December, her 
supervisor told Petti that she would be transferred back in early January.  She received a 
report, conducted at the construction site by an external consultant during her absence, 
indicating that the construction site was free of external debris or other hazards.  Petti 
subsequently filed an occupational safety complaint with New Jersey’s Public Employees 
Occupational Safety and Health Program (“PEOSH”) stating concerns about air quality 
and debris at her workplace. 
 On her second day back at the office — which was ultimately her last day working 
at OCHD — Petti left early and submitted a letter to her supervisor requesting 
unspecified reasonable accommodations.  She also submitted a doctor’s note on her 
return stating that she was advised to avoid exposure to dust, chemicals, construction 
materials, and respiratory irritants, due to “pulmonary dysfunction.”  App. at 50.  
Miragliotta sent Petti a letter that day confirming that she had been sent two reports 
indicating that her building was safe from construction debris and informing her that 
other OCHD offices had ongoing construction. 
 On January 9, 2013, Petti indicated that she had experienced an allergic reaction 
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when she had returned to the office and asked to be moved to a different building.  She 
submitted a doctor’s note requesting that she be excused from work due to allergy 
symptoms of an “undetermined etiology.”  Appellees’ Suppl. App. at 430.  Several days 
later, Petti requested workers’ compensation because her whole body was itchy and her 
eyes were swollen; Petti claimed that the reaction stemmed from exposure to construction 
debris.  She also submitted a letter from her doctor requesting that she be relocated so 
that she would “not be exposed to irritants that exacerbate her lung condition.”  App. at 
56.  Petti then underwent a physical examination pursuant to her workers’ compensation 
request.  The examining doctor noted that Petti repeatedly denied having any breathing 
problems or a rash and that she refused to consent to pulmonary function tests or to 
permit the doctor to speak with her other physicians.  The doctor ultimately concluded 
that the itchiness Petti reported was likely due to dry skin. 
 On January 16, 2013, Ocean County’s Public Health Coordinator informed Petti 
that he was researching her concerns.  Petti then submitted a leave request backdated to 
January 2, 2013, under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”).  She attached a 
medical certificate by her doctor stating that she was experiencing “shortness of breath 
after exposure to construction dust.”  Appellees’ Suppl. App. at 476.  On February 7, 
2013, Petti’s FMLA request was approved for 12 weeks. 
 While Petti was on FMLA leave, Ocean County contracted an external evaluator 
to test the room where Petti worked and surrounding rooms for mold; the tests came back 
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in the normal range.  Additionally, PEOSH conducted an unannounced inspection of 
Ocean County’s Finance Department, in which investigators interviewed employees and 
conducted air quality tests of the room in which Petti worked and the area outside of the 
building.  The Enforcement Coordinator of PEOSH concluded that no violations of health 
standards were observed during the inspection. 
 On April 8, 2013, Petti submitted a request for an additional leave of absence with 
an indeterminate end date, indicating that “she need[ed] to be away from construction 
dust.”  Appellees’ Suppl. App. at 512.  Her request was denied several days later because 
she failed to provide a complete medical certification or an end date.  Petti was directed 
to return to work, but she did not return. 
 On May 8, 2013, Miragliotta sent Petti a letter detailing the steps that had been 
taken to ensure that her workplace was safe and noting the doctor’s evaluation from her 
workers’ compensation examination.  The letter indicated that Petti’s work location had 
been moved away from the windows in her office, that she would be provided with a 
respirator or particulate dust mask at work, and that, “out of an abundance of caution,” an 
air scrubber would be installed in her department.  App. at 66. 
 Through an attorney, Petti requested information about the particulate dust mask.  
At the end of May, Petti’s doctor sent a letter to OCHD stating that Petti could not wear a 
respirator for extended periods of time because she had a neck injury and a latex allergy.  
Ocean County’s legal counsel requested a meeting with Petti, but she did not respond. 
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 In July, Ocean County initiated formal disciplinary proceedings to terminate Petti 
for insubordination, excessive absenteeism,2 and resignation not in good standing.  On 
August 21, 2013, a hearing officer concluded that Ocean County’s termination of Petti 
was warranted on all three proposed grounds.  After Petti appealed the determination, an 
administrative law judge upheld the charges of excessive absenteeism and resignation not 
in good standing.  However, he dismissed the charge of insubordination as unwarranted 
after concluding that Petti reasonably relied on her doctors’ opinions; he also determined 
that a sixty-day suspension and resignation in good standing was the appropriate 
sanction.  His decision was upheld on appeal. 
Petti commenced this action in the District Court in October 2015.3  Following 
early litigation and discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment.  The District 
Court granted their motion.  Petti timely appealed after the District Court granted her an 
extension of time to appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5). 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s grant of summary judgment for defendants.   See 
Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014).  Summary judgment 
 
2  Petti’s disciplinary record included instances of excessive breaks and absences in 
March and June 2012, prior to the beginning of the construction work. 
3  Petti filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”) alleging disability discrimination in May 2014.  She was 
ultimately issued a right-to-sue letter regarding her charge. 
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is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  A genuine 
dispute of material fact exists if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to 
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 
248 (1986). 
III. 
 We agree with the District Court’s grant of summary judgment for defendants.  
First, Petti did not state a prima facie case of ADA discrimination based on her claim that 
OCHD failed to provide requested reasonable accommodations.  To establish a prima 
facie case of discrimination under the ADA, an employee must show that she: (1) is 
disabled; (2) is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or 
without reasonable accommodations by her employer; and (3) has suffered an adverse 
employment action as a result of her disability, including her employer’s refusal to make 
reasonable accommodation for her disability.  Hohider v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 574 
F.3d 169, 186 (3d Cir. 2009).  Once an employee requests a reasonable accommodation, 
her employer must assist the employee in seeking accommodations through a “flexible, 
interactive process,” id. at 187 (internal citation omitted), and both employers and 
employees “have a duty to assist in the search for appropriate reasonable accommodation 
and to act in good faith,” Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 312 (3d Cir. 
1999). 
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 In this case, assuming without deciding that Petti can make out the first two 
elements of a prima facie case, the record reflects OCHD’s consistent good faith efforts 
to respond to Petti’s requests regarding the safety of her workplace, given the medical 
conditions she represented she had.  See id. at 317 (“All the interactive process requires is 
that employers make a good-faith effort to seek accommodations.”).  OCHD promptly 
responded to Petti’s initial requests about environmental hazards with information about 
prior safety testing that had been conducted on the site and information about her 
building’s separate ventilation system.  In response to Petti’s continued concerns, OCHD 
moved her to another location while it investigated the safety of her work space.  After an 
external consultant examined the site and determined that the outside construction work 
was free of external debris or other hazards, she was asked to return to her usual work 
location.  In early January, after Petti reported having an allergic reaction at work, OCHD 
informed her that it would again review her concerns; in the following month, OCHD 
approved her request for FMLA leave, hired another external consultant to conduct mold 
testing, and complied with an unannounced PEOSH inspection. 
After mold testing came back in the normal range and the PEOSH inspection came 
back without any violations, OCHD denied Petti’s incomplete request for a further leave 
of absence but offered to install an air scrubber in her workspace and provide her with a 
respirator or a particulate dust mask; it also noted that her work location had been moved 
away from any windows.  Petti requested further information about the particulate dust 
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mask, but communication ultimately broke down when Petti failed to respond OCHD’s 
request for a meeting to discuss its proposed accommodations for her.  See id. (explaining 
that “an employer cannot be faulted if after conferring with the employee to find possible 
accommodations,” the interactive process breaks down due to the employee’s actions or 
omissions).  Although Petti insisted at several points during this process that the only 
solution to her concerns was to move her to another building outside of her department, 
she did not provide evidence to explain how her concerns could be accommodated 
elsewhere when other OCHD buildings were also undergoing construction.  Accordingly, 
the District Court correctly granted summary judgment for defendants on Petti’s ADA 
discrimination claim. 
Next, Petti failed to establish a prima facie case of Title VII retaliation because she 
did not show that her engagement in a protected activity under Title VII was a but-for 
cause of her termination.  To make out a prima facie case of Title VII retaliation, a 
plaintiff must show that: “(1) she engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) the 
employer took an adverse employment action against her; and (3) there was a causal 
connection between her participation in the protected activity and the adverse 
employment action.”  Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 340-41 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(citation omitted).  A plaintiff asserting a Title VII retaliation claim “must establish that 
his or her protected activity was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the 
employer.”  Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013). 
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Petti has argued that her filing of a confidential complaint with PEOSH constitutes 
protected activity and that she was fired in retaliation for filing that complaint.  However, 
even assuming that OCHD knew that Petti filed a complaint, she relies solely on the time 
that passed between her complaint and her termination to establish causation.  See 
Carvalho-Grevious v. Del. State Univ., 851 F.3d 249, 260 (3d Cir. 2017) (explaining that 
a plaintiff can establish but-for causation “by proffering evidence of an employer’s 
inconsistent explanation for taking an adverse employment action, a pattern of 
antagonism, or temporal proximity ‘unusually suggestive of retaliatory motive’”) 
(internal citations omitted).  The six months that passed between Petti’s filing of a 
complaint and OCHD’s initiation of termination proceedings against her are not 
“unusually suggestive of retaliatory motive” such that timing alone could establish but-
for causation.  See Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 760 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (concluding that a gap of over two months, taken alone, is insufficient to be 
“unduly suggestive” of retaliation), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in 
Robinson v. First State Cmty. Action Agency, 920 F.3d 182, 187-89 & n.30 (3d Cir. 
2019).  Thus, summary judgment was properly granted for defendants on Petti’s 
retaliation claim. 
Finally, we agree with the District Court that Petti’s common law claim for 
wrongful termination is preempted where she has a statutory remedy.  See Lawrence v. 
Nat’l Westminster Bank N.J., 98 F.3d 61, 73 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating that where “the 
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sources of public policy [a plaintiff] relies on are coterminous with his statutory claims, 
he cannot advance a separate common law public policy claim”).  Petti’s wrongful 
termination claim was based on the same facts as her discrimination and retaliation 
claims.  Because a wrongful termination claim would not protect any additional interest 
beyond the protections of the ADA and Title VII under these circumstances, summary 
judgment was properly granted for defendants on Petti’s remaining claim.4 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.5 
 
4  To the extent that Petti challenges the District Court’s resolution of several motions she 
filed, we conclude that the District Court did not err in its decisions. 
 
5  Additionally, we grant appellees’ motion to file a supplemental appendix, which 
includes relevant documents from the record that Petti did not provide in her appendix, 
and deny Petti’s motion to file a supplemental appendix, which does not contain record 
evidence.  We deny Petti’s motion for sanctions, her motion for oral argument, and her 
motion to strike appellees’ response to her motion for oral argument; we grant Petti’s 
motion to file corrections to her brief. 
